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This paper focuses on environmental taxes and charges within the EU. This 
issue is particularly interesting as it concerns not only a new dimension in 
environmental policy but also the domain of taxation which remains the 
(almost) exclusive competence of the 15 Member States.
The opening section deals with the relevant parts of the Treaty of the 
European Union and the restructuring of environmental policy in the 1990s. It 
focuses on the institutional and policy framework in which economic 
instruments, as part of EU environmental policy, are being developed. Some 
specific examples in the fields of energy taxation and environmental levies are 
considered, as well as how the environment could be integrated into the broader 
context of comprehensive fiscal reform. The second part of the paper considers 
the division of responsibility between the EU and its respective member states, 
and briefly describes the increasing use of new instruments at the national level. 
The third section outlines some of the problems inherent to a proliferation of 
national instruments, and discusses several mechanisms available for preventing 
distortion of the internal market, including the emerging EU legal framework 
surrounding the use of fiscal instruments in Member States.
Redesigning environmental instruments at the EU level
When environmental legislation and harmonisation of the laws of individual 
Member States started in the European Community in the 1970s, it was mainly 
related to the functioning of the internal market. The Single European Act 
adopted in 1987 gave EU environment policy a much firmer basis through a full 
chapter in the Treaty, Articles 130R-T. That Treaty introduced three 
fundamental principles which are of relevance when considering 
implementation of economic instruments such as environmental charges and 
taxes:
• that prevention is better than cure;
• that damage should be rectified at its source; 
that the polluter should pay.
The next change to the legal framework governing environmental action came 
in the Treaty of European Union. Article 2 of the Treaty signed in Maastricht, 
November 1993 states: “The Community shall have as its task...to 
promote...sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment.” 



























































































March 1992, set the framework for action, stressing as key objectives the 
integration of environment into economic policies, and the broadening of the 
range of instruments.
The institutional discussions on the future shape of the European Union, and 
the continued economic recession of the mid-1990s, have led to a fundamental 
reflection on the nature of the Union's environmental legislation. Part of this 
discussion relates to the question of whether and how the cost-effectiveness of 
environmental policy measures could be improved. Most European 
environmental policy has been produced fairly recently and has in many cases 
been prompted by ad-hoc pressures. The result is a body of some 200 
^environmental laws which are based mainly on technical regulation. This 
represents the starting point for consolidation and improvement. Recent 
criticism, evidenced clearly by the Molitor Report, has focused on two main 
elements: the cost-effectiveness and coherence of the legislation in place (EC 
1995, Collier 1997). In other words, the fundamental message is more 
concerned with the need for urgent re-regulation rather than deregulation. It is 
generally recognised that deregulation would not be in line with the consistent 
message the European citizen has been giving, for example through 
Eurobarometer polls, in which environmental policy and employment creation 
continue to appear as the two most important objectives for the EU.
A key theme in this reflection concerns the need for a sharper distinction 
between objectives and instruments. In particular the use of environmental 
quality objectives as explicit policy aims is likely to increase in the coming 
years. It is becoming essential to define more precisely what is meant by “clean” 
air, “clean” water, etc. At the European level, a framework directive (94/62/EC) 
on ambient air quality was adopted in 1996. Daughter directives on S02, NOx, 
lead, particulate matter and ozone are being prepared, each of which 
incorporates extensive reliance on economic evaluation techniques.
An equally important aspect of restructuring EU environmental policy is the 
commitment to a broader range of instruments (EC 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996). 
The attractions for the use of economic and, particularly, fiscal incentives are 
multiple. In principle, they reduce the costs of compliance for industry, and 
therefore the consumer. They provide flexibility for industry in their response to 
environmental objectives and a continuous incentive for technological 
innovation. They also provide revenues which can be used to reduce other more 
distorting taxes. Taxes might be levied on input material, energy, products, 
emissions and waste. Depreciation allowances can be varied so that investments 




























































































There has been wide recognition and acceptance of the idea that tax reforms 
are required, shifting tax burdens away from labour and capital towards natural 
resource consumption in order to achieve the so called double dividend- 
simultaneous environmental and economic improvement (see Golub 1997a). 
The idea was developed in the 1993 White Paper of the Commission on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (COM (93) 700). As discussed 
below, and in the other working papers of this series, significant tax shifts of 
this kind have already occurred in some EU countries, mostly centred around 
energy and carbon taxes.
The relevance of energy taxation for Community policy concerns its ability 
to promote the use of more efficient technologies in general and to create 
incentives for consumers and producers to use cleaner fuels, not least because 
the more polluting fuels are usually cheaper to produce. The picture is, 
however, complex from a European Union point of view: 15 Member States, 
with different structures of primary energy use and endowment of energy 
resources, with different industrial structures and degrees of economic 
development, and finally with different environmental priorities and problems. 
In this respect, the European Commission has defined climate change and 
acidification as environmental problems where common action may bring value 
added to the policies Member States are implementing, because of their 
transboundary or global nature. Many local environmental problems, such as 
urban air quality, are caused by products which are extensively traded within 
the internal market (e.g. cars and fuels), and hence they are also more efficiently 
tackled through common initiatives at European level.
The carbon/energy tax proposal
The carbon/energy tax proposal was adopted in 1992 as a part of a 
comprehensive strategy presented by the European Union at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Heller 1997, 
Skjaerseth, J. 1994). The joint Energy/Environment Council decision of October 
1990 to stabilise CO2 emissions in 2000 at 1990 levels was integrated in the 
Climate Change Convention. Recent simulations and forecasts confirm that the 
European Union is unlikely to reach its stabilisation target in the year 2000 
without the use of an appropriate fiscal instrument.
Tax rates were proposed equivalent to 3 US dollars per barrel of oil 
equivalent at the outset, with annual increases taking it to 10 dollars after seven 
years. Several specific provisions were incorporated in view of mitigating the 




























































































treatment for energy intensive industries was provided for, and the revenues 
raised (+/- 1 % GDP of the EU) were to be used to offset other taxes.
The intensive discussion in the institutions of the European Union centred 
on two themes, the competitiveness impacts on industry and the increased fiscal 
competence of the Community. On the former theme, energy-intensive industry 
opposed the measure fearing loss of market share. Any decision would, 
according to industry, have to be followed up by analogous evolutions in the 
world, or at least within the OECD region. However, the decisive factor 
preventing the adoption of the carbon/energy tax proposal has been the 
unwillingness of some Member States to increase the tax competence of the 
European Community.
Transport
The regulatory model to control transport-related air pollution followed by the 
Community has been based primarily on setting emission standards associated 
with vehicle emissions control technology (e.g. catalytic converters) and with 
fuel quality (e.g. lead in gasoline). This is fundamentally a normative and 
technical model, which establishes emission limit values that must apply across 
the European Union, and depends on the existence of effective programmes of 
inspection and maintenance of vehicles to control their compliance with the 
standards.
With a view to improve and to update the existent legislation, the so-called 
auto-oil programme was created four years ago as a cooperation venture 
between the motor vehicle industry, the oil industry, and the Commission. The 
objective was to generate sufficiently reliable data and technical analysis to be 
used in the preparation of two proposals for directives on motor vehicle 
emission standards and on the quality of gasoline and diesel fuels. The 
proposals were adopted by the Commission on 18 June 1996 (COM(96) 248) 
and will be discussed in the European Parliament and the Council.
The auto-oil programme incorporates the question of how to ensure a cost- 
effective set of new proposals. To date, the regulatory approach has not made as 
much use of non-technical measures and economic incentives as their cost- 
effectiveness would imply.
A potentially cost-effective, non-technical policy measure is based on tax 
differentiation. Recent experience in Europe shows the effectiveness of tax 
differentials to facilitate the introduction of vehicles equipped with new 




























































































percentage of unleaded gasoline sales, for example, has increased from below 1 
percent in 1986 to on average 53 percent in 1993.
The role of fiscal incentives, differentiated or not, is not limited to 
facilitating the adoption of new vehicle technologies or cleaner fuels. Damage 
to public health, ecosystems and buildings, for example, caused by motor 
vehicle air pollution are primarily social costs, not covered by road users. 
Economic efficiency suggests that those social costs should be internalized, 
which is equivalent to the implementation of the “polluter pays principle”. The 
green Paper ‘Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport” (COM(95) 691)) 
adopted by the Commission suggests the need to reform vehicle and fuel 
taxation to better reflect their respective environmental costs.
Comprehensive reform
Finally, tax ‘rationalisation’-th e  need to ensure that environmental 
considerations are included in tax rules introduced in the past, is becoming an 
increasingly important issue. A case in point is the regulation that kerosene for 
aviation fuel should be exempted from taxes, and the environmental problems 
related to the expansion of air transport. As a matter of fact, about 15.5% of 
external costs of air pollution in Europe can be attributed to air transport. As in !—  
the case of cars, it should be asked whether environmental taxation is able to 
reduce air emissions more cost effectively than standards or technical devices.
A consultancy study, conducted on behalf of the Commission, which 
examined environmental implications of tax systems, identified significant 
scope for action (EC 1997). One conclusion from the study is that the current 
VAT-system offers room for improvement as concerns rational consumption of 
water and energy. It also concludes that urban sprawl and use of company cars 
are being favored through privileged tax provisions. Changes in some of these 
provisions could have positive effects for the environment and favour efficiency 
in resource allocation.
Thus a comprehensive strategy to enhance the cost-effectiveness of 
environmental policy must examine the consistency of current tax provisions 
vis-a-vis environmental objectives. In this field, one can not expect things to 
change overnight. However, there would be progress if policymakers in the 
Member States considered the environmental implications of the exemptions 
and derogations in their tax systems.
Once an environmental objective has been defined, either at EU or at 




























































































of reaching it remains. The Commission supports an approach whereby in most 
cases the choice of instruments is determined at national level. This is often 
rational because ecosystems and geographical conditions vary amongst Member 
States. Moreover, preferences for instruments may differ.
An objective may be reached in one place through technical regulation, 
while elsewhere levies or negotiated agreements may be preferred. In the past, 
however, a common thread has been the emphasis placed on the definition of 
EU wide technical standards, mostly known as Best Available Technology. The 
use of technical harmonisation was seen as an essential means of avoiding 
unnecessary competitive pressures within the internal market.
Increasingly, however, it has been stressed other instruments than technical 
harmonisation may be more cost effective in solving environmental problems. 
Therefore much stress has been put on broadening the range of instruments 
available at the national level, mostly as a complement to the technical 
regulation. The following section briefly examines such developments in 
several states.
New Instruments in Member States
Since the early 1990s, there has been an increase in the use of environmental 
levies and charges in the Member States, e.g. on fertilisers, pesticides, 
packaging, batteries etc. This increase has in many ways led to a substantial 
improvement in reaching environmental objectives.
At national level, there are interesting initiatives along the lines proposed in 
the 1993 white paper on growth, competitiveness and employment advocating a 
reduction of indirect labour costs (about 1-2% of GDP), to be financed by other 
taxes like carbon and energy taxation, on energy taxes in general.
Belgium Energy tax on households to finance employers contributions to social 
security schemes. Ministerial Commission is preparing a variety of 
ecotaxes on products.
Denmark General tax reform 1994-98 decreased labour taxes to 2.7% of GDP 
and increased ecotaxes to 1.4% of GDP. Energy Package 1996-2000 
increases taxes on industrial energy use by 0.2% of GDP, partly 




























































































Netherlands Energy tax on small scale users mainly recycled as lower labour taxes.
Green Tax Commission is looking at a possible “greening” of the tax 
system.
United Kingdom Land-fill tax recycled as lower social security contributions.
Luxembourg Cuts in employers social security contributions financed by increased 
energy taxes.
Sweden Green Tax Commission is looking at a possible "greening” of the tax 
system. Increases in CO2 tax rates.
Such national initiatives are evidence of the interest that Member States have in 
developing their economic and fiscal policies in complementary directions, thus 
diminishing the distortions of the fiscal system at the lowest cost and enhancing 
the effectiveness of environmental policy. In this respect, it should also be noted 
that Member State are under pressure to stabilise or reduce their budget deficits 
in view of further integration, particularly monetary union.
National diversity and preserving the single market
Given the continuing need to maintain a level economic playing field, Member 
States considering implementation of environmental levies (such as taxes, 
charges etc.) have sometimes been faced with an apparent contradiction 
between the environmental objectives of the Treaty and the other Treaty 
objectives-most notably the functioning of the internal market and technical 
harmonisation.
It is useful to distinguish between environmental levies on products and 
emissions. While levies on emissions in principle only affect domestic firms, 
e g. factories situated in that Member State, levies on products can affect both 
domestic and foreign producers. Hence, levies on products tend to be more 
sensitive from an internal market point of view. The potential problems between 
levies and trade arise from the possibility of discrimination against imported 
products compared to domestically produced goods in an open or hidden way 
through a number of means:
a higher levy on imported than domestically produced products. Such 





























































































• a levy on products which are largely imported, while close substitutes 
produced domestically do not bear the levy. Such a case could be defendable, 
e g. if the domestic products have a similar function but a better 
environmental effect. However, such a system could also be misused for 
purely protectionist purposes.
• in the packaging field it is increasingly common that levies give preference to 
reusable packaging compared to one way (recyclable) packaging. Such levies 
have created controversy, as it is often easier for a producer close to the local 
market to organise a deposit/retum or bring-back system.
- Levies often cause resistance, and have a tendency of giving rise to complaints 
to the Commission. Often both the complainants and the defenders (Member 
States) refer to EU legislation to support their views. After discussion with 
involved parties-Member States, complainants etc.—some modifications of tax 
laws often leads to a situation that satisfies all parties. There have therefore not 
been any fundamental European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases on environmental 
taxes or charges.
Traditional legal constraints on national experimentation
When Member States wish to use environmental taxes there are a number of 
different EU laws they need to be aware of, which are embodied in the Treaty 
and in secondary legislation such as directives and regulations.
The main relevant principles of the Treaty are expressed in Articles 9/12, 
30/36, 76, 92-93,95,99, 100a, 130R-S. In summary, these articles aim to ensure 
that competition within the single market is not unduly disrupted by
- customs duties or charges having equivalent effect;
- quantitative restrictions on imports or exports of goods between Member 
States;
- state aid constituting distortions of competition affecting intra Community 
trade;
- internal taxation discriminating against imported products or otherwise 
protecting national production.
Protection of the environment is a legitimate objective of general interest and 





























































































The borderline between customs duties and taxes is of relevance because the 
Treaty contains an absolute prohibition on customs duties and charges with 
similar effect as customs duties, while it only contains a prohibition against 
taxes which are discriminatory. If the revenues from a tax are used to fully 
offset the burden for domestic producers, the charge will be assessed as a 
customs duty or charge with similar effect. If the tax falls only on imported 
products, it can be assessed as a tax if the charge system is part of a general 
internal unbiased taxation system.
As regards the borderline between taxation and quantitative restrictions, 
environmental taxes in general fall within the scope of Art. 95 (taxation) which 
normally excludes the application of Art. 30 (quantitative restrictions). 
However, there are two situations where Art. 30 would apply. First, Art. 30 
would apply in the absence of any similar or competing domestic production 
and in so far as the levy is of such an amount that the free movement of goods is 
impeded. Secondly, if the measures consist of several conditions or factors 
which are not necessarily linked to the levy itself or its proper functioning, such 
factors or conditions-for example labeling requirements-may then be assessed 
under Art. 30.
If Article 30 is applicable, the protection of the environment is recognized as 
a so called “mandatory requirement” which may justify the measure even if it 
would hinder the free movement of goods (ECJ Court case on Danish Bottles, 
Case C-302/86, 20/9-1988). In such a case, the following conditions shall be 
met:
- The measure must be non-discriminatory,
- It should be shown to be necessary in order to meet the environmental 
objective,
- The burden which the measure imposes should be proportionate in relation 
to the objective of protecting the environment.
Internal taxation
Article 95 aims at guaranteeing the complete neutrality of internal taxation as 
regards competition between domestic and imported products. However, 
differentiated taxation of imported and similar domestic products is legal 
provided the taxation is non-protective. Indeed, the ECJ has ruled (14 January 
1981, Taxation of denatured alcohol, Case 46-80, [1981] ECR 77), that 





























































































tax arrangements which differentiate between certain products on the basis of 
objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw materials used or the production 
processes employed.
Proportionality, i.e. balancing the gain for the environment with the 
potential impact on the Single Market, is not applicable when assessing an 
ecotax according to Article 95, except, as stated above, when it concerns 
administrative control measures of the levy.
The definition of a ‘similar’ product is important in determining whether a 
tax is discriminating. The case-law takes into account not only the objective 
characteristics of products, but also whether they satisfy the same consumer 
needs. The consumer impression of a product is thus an important aspect when 
assessing compatibility with Community law. By adopting a Regulation on 
ecolabelling, the Community has implicitly recognised that ecologically adapted 
products are not similar to products with the same function, but with different 
ecological properties. The ecological difference could be embodied in the 
product, or be due to differences in production methods (this regulation is 
discussed in ch9).
The case law of the Court also indicates that the mere fact that a tax is levied 
predominantly on imports is not enough to deem the tax discriminatory. The 
Court ruled that a tax which impose heavier charges on a certain product than 
on another one on the basis of the raw materials used and the manufacturing 
process employed, is not a violation of Article 95, if it is applied identically to 
the two categories of products.
Even when an environmental tax is based on objective and non- 
discriminatory criteria, it may be necessary to take into account how the revenue 
from the charge is used, in order to make a complete assessment of its effect on 
the internal market. When the revenue from a charge is used to partly offset the 
burden borne by domestic products, the charge constitutes discriminatory 
taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty (Case C 17/91, [1992] 
ECR 1 6523).
State aid
One area of concern to many Member States is the distributional impact of 
environmental levies. One way of addressing these concerns and increasing the 
acceptability of environmental levies is by using the revenues for specific 
purposes. For example, revenues can be redistributed to those who paid them, 




























































































payment. Alternatively, the revenue may be used for specific environmental 
purposes such as support for environmental investments or financing the 
collection of dangerous waste.
But the use of revenue can also have negative effects. According to the 
Treaty, state aid to firms is in principle not allowed. Permission must be sought 
from the Commission. Handing back revenues from environmental levies, either 
as investment support or in other ways is considered to be state aid, and thus, 
must fulfill certain requirements.
Under Article 92, any aid granted by a Member State which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the common market. Revenues from levies 
constitute “state resources,” and their use may therefore constitute state aid in 
the meaning of Article 92. Exemptions from an environmental tax might also 
constitute aid. The principles according to which aid schemes pursuing 
environmental objectives shall be assessed by the Commission are set out in the 
Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJC 72, 
10.3.1994, p. 3), as will be further discussed below.
Secondary legislation on indirect taxation
Community legislation adopted under Article 99 contains
a) harmonised rules on tax structure and minimum rates for excise duties on 
mineral oils, tobacco and alcoholic beverages
b) other general provisions in directive 92/12/EEC, allowing Member States to 
introduce indirect taxes on products provided that those taxes do not give rise to 
border-crossing formalities in trade between Member States.
An important provision of Directive 92/81/EEC (OJL 316, 31.10.1992, p. 12) is 
that in general, only one tax rate per product can be used. Directive 92/12/EEC 
(OJL 76, 23.03.1992, p. 1) provides Member States with the possibility, within 
certain restrictions, to introduce other national taxes on mineral oils. Such taxes 
must comply with the rules applicable for excise duty and VAT. Member States 
may request authorization from the Council to apply reduced tax rates or 
exemptions, e.g. for environmental reasons. Granted derogations concern tax 
differentiation such as reduced rates on environmentally improved diesel and on 
reformulated unleaded and leaded petrol. In addition, as discussed below, 




























































































mineral oils used for specific purposes, for example, in the field of public 
transport and within the agriculture sector.
Notification
The above examples show how Community law affects the use of 
environmental levies within the internal market. The levies can potentially harm 
the functioning of the internal market, e.g. by being misused for protectionist 
purposes, without creating benefit for the environment. At the same time it is 
clear that these levies can be very efficient in pursuing environmental policy. 
Thus it is important for the Commission to strike a balance between the 
environment, trade aspects, and avoiding misuse of environmental levies. The 
issues involved are often complex, resulting in a number of cases involving 
intense discussions between representatives for the environment and industry.
An important information tool is the notification requirement. This means 
that Member States in general have to inform the Commission before 
introducing a new measure. Through this procedure the Commission can study 
the proposal to ascertain its compatibility with Community legislation. In the 
process, other Member States are also informed, and have the opportunity to 
comment.
For measures considered to be state aid, including exemptions from new 
taxes, notification is compulsory. A state aid scheme put into operation without 
being notified is illegal, and the Commission may order the Member State to 
suspend the aid programme to give time for investigation. Should the Member 
State refuse, it risks being brought in front of the ECJ. So far this has not 
happened.
For environmental taxation the notification requirement is more indirect. 
Directive (83/189/EEC) contains a requirement for Member States to notify 
technical standards and regulations which are linked to fiscal or financial 
measures affecting the consumption of products. Normally this directive 
requires a standstill period of three months, giving time for the Commission to 
investigate, but this requirement does not apply to the fiscally related technical 
regulations.
If the Commission finds that any element of a new law does not fulfill the 
requirement of the Treaty it can demand the Member State to postpone 
implementation until certain changes in the legislation are made. Should the 
Member state refuse, it again risks being brought in front of the ECJ. During 




























































































State concerned, other Member States which may have interest in the case and 
complainants take place. The objective is always to try to find a solution which 
satisfies all parties. So far no case has been taken to the Court of Justice by the 
Commission.
Emerging EU Framework
While the Treaty and secondary legislation provide a certain amount of 
guidance, a substantial level of uncertainty remains over how much scope 
national governments have to devise and apply new environmental instruments. 
A central objective of the Commission is therefore to provide Member States 
(including EEA states) with clarification on controversial issues related to the 
use of environmental levies, and provide guidance on existing possibilities to 
use them, as regulated by EU law. This section discusses several recently 
adopted pieces of an emerging EU framework, and describes some of the ways 
in which more formal, written guidelines for new national instruments might 
alter the relationship between the Commission and the member states.
The recognition of the need for a variety of instruments to reflect differing 
situations leads to new questions which have so far gone unanswered. As 
discussed above, the Treaty and its related legislation create some limitations on 
the freedom of action of the Member States, in particular where the functioning 
of the internal market may be affected. Hence, there is a need to spell out the 
legislative framework with which new environmental policy instruments can be 
introduced at national level. Obvious candidates for such initiatives are 
guidelines covering environmental taxes, voluntary or negotiated agreements, 
and environmental liability rules. This section looks only at the first of these 
categories.
Subsidies
Explicit guidelines exist on environmental state aid provided by Member States 
to firms (OJC 72, 10.3.1994). The guidelines were developed in 1993 in order 
to clarify for Member States for which objectives and to which intensity aid is 
allowed. Before the guidelines existed, there were often long discussions on 
whether different aid programmes were in conformity or not with state aid 
regulations.
The guidelines basically state that state aid to support environmental 
investments is allowed, by between 30% and 40%, only if the investments aim 




























































































required by mandatory standards. However, for plants older than two years, 
state aid of between 15% and 25% may be authorized also to comply with 
mandatory requirements. The guidelines also indicate that exemption from 
environmental taxes, which is regarded as state aid, may be allowed if it is 
necessary to prevent domestic firms being placed at disadvantage compared 
with their competitors in countries that do not have such measures.
Environmental agreements
In the Communication on Environmental Agreements (COM(96) 561) of 27 
November 1996, the Commission presented guidelines for the use of 
agreements between public authorities and industry in the field of the 
environment. The background for this initiative is the principle of shared 
responsibility and the need to broaden the range of policy instruments to 
achieve a better instrument mix.
Environmental Agreements can be legally binding with obligations for both 
parties, but they may also be non-binding “gentleman’s agreements" in the form 
of a unilateral commitment recognized by the public authority. They can bring 
about effective measures in advance of legislation and thus reduce the volume 
of regulatory and administrative actions.
In addition, Environmental Agreements can encourage a pro-active approach 
from industry, and are likely to lead to cost-effective measures, because they 
allow industry to adjust environmental investment to their medium term capital 
investments. They can also be more quickly implemented than regulations, 
which is an important advantage in areas with fast technological developments.
On the other hand, not all of the past “voluntary” agreements were 
transparent and credible. The Commission therefore suggests that interested 
parties should be consulted before an agreement is concluded and that 
agreements should, wherever possible, be binding on the parties. They should 
go beyond unspecified “best effort” clauses and include quantified targets. 
Clear monitoring measures should be defined. Third party verification is also 
suggested as well as the publication of the agreement and of the results 
achieved.
While agreements are instruments which can be used at local, regional, 
national, Community and international level, the competencies of the European 
Community only relate to agreements concluded at Community level and to 
national agreements used to implement Community directives. Both aspects are 




























































































preconditions for the use of agreements need to be further clarified. Based on 
the Communication, the Commission issued a Recommendation concerning 
how environmental agreements can be used in implementing Community 
Directives (OJL 333, p.59, 21.12.1996).
Environmental taxes
The Commission recently published a Communication entitled “Environmental 
taxes and charges in the single market” (COM(97)9). The document supports 
the use of environmental taxes and charges in the Member States that are used 
in a way compatible with Community legislation. The document therefore 
explains the legal framework applicable to Member States, and clarifies both 
the possibilities and constraints for Member States to act in this field.
The document mainly deals with product taxation, as this is the area most 
sensitive to internal market aspects. It is explained that the effects of the 
European legislation, among other things, are that:
• if a levy has a clearly positive environmental effect, it may be judged in a 
more positive way in terms of its effect on other policy areas.
•  levies may not be used to discriminate against products from other Member
States.
•  levies should be in accordance with secondary legislation on indirect 
taxation, e.g. in the field of energy taxation, where detailed rules exist.
• exemptions from paying the levy, and the way revenues from environmental 
levies are used, should fulfill rules in the field of state aid.
The document also specifies when Member States have to inform the 
Commission of their activities (notification rules). Such rules exist in the 
following areas:
• state aid.
• technical standards and regulations linked to fiscal measures (Directive 
83/189/EC).
•  national measures taken to transpose Community Directives into national 
law.
As this is a rapidly evolving area, the Commission will closely follow the 




























































































their impact on the single market and on environmental policy. The 
Commission plans to carry out an evaluation on the economic and 
environmental effects of their use. The results of this work will be used to draw 
policy conclusions on the further use of environmental taxes and charges on 
Community and Member State levels. However, this does not mean that the 
Commission will not make proposals in this field before the evaluation is 
finalized.
Energy and fuel taxes
A substantial amount of work has gone into developing EC guidelines in the 
area of national energy and fuel taxes. The carbon/energy tax proposal together 
with the globalisation of the economy and the increased competitive pressure on 
European industry provoked a fundamental debate on the future of taxation in 
the European Union. This debate was launched by the European Commission in 
the previously mentioned White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment. It was shown that over recent decades, a significant erosion of tax 
revenues has taken place, originally only related to capital income.
The trend of the last few years, to increase tax revenues from labour, is no 
longer considered an appropriate way to compensate for this loss. Such a policy 
increases indirect labour costs and hinders the creation of new jobs, hence 
contributing to the historically high and persistent unemployment figures in the 
European Union. In this context, the Member States rely increasingly on two 
types of indirect taxes to counter the structural erosion of their tax receipts: 
value added taxes to be paid on all final consumption, or specific taxes on 
certain goods, e.g. energy products.
The Member States of the European Union have a long history of energy 
taxation, in particular on mineral oil products. This form of taxation was not 
originally motivated by environmental concerns. Governments tend to see 
energy as a stable fiscal base because of the relatively inelastic demand. Over 
the last decade and a half, energy taxation has increased slightly from 2.1 % to 
2.6% of GDP for the EU as a whole. Researchers have concluded that the side- 
effects of this type of taxation have been beneficial for the environment: it has 
been shown that it contributed substantially to the higher overall fuel efficiency 
of the car fleet in Europe compared to the United States. Today, consumer taxes 
on motor fuels, i.e. excise and value added tax, constitute some 65% - 75% of 
the final price (see Figure 1). Thus, Member States have a powerful tool, not 





































































































% tax % ad 
valorem
B 220 632 852 0.74 2.87 231 413 644 0.64 1.79
DK 211 613 824 0.74 2.91 215 428 643 0.67 1.99
D 203 628 831 0.76 3.09 225 411 636 0.65 1.83
ELL 187 459 646 0.71 2.45 180 328 508 0.65 1.82
ES 212 469 681 0.69 2.21 201 348 549 0.63 1.73
FR 170 730 900 0.81 4.29 175 464 639 0.73 2.65
IRE 226 459 685 0.67 2.03 268 411 679 0.61 1.53
IT 222 634 856 0.74 2.86 217 474 691 0.69 2.18
LUX 211 430 641 0.67 2.04 198 332 530 0.63 1.68
NL 231 676 907 0.75 2.93 234 427 661 0.65 1.82
AUS 262 568 830 0.68 2.17 255 411 666 0.62 1.61
PO 225 557 782 0.71 2.48 200 341 541 0.63 1.71
SUO 219 717 936 0.77 3.27 225 405 630 0.64 1.80
sw 233 663 896 0.74 2.85 319 448 767 0.58 1.40
UK 164 506 670 0.76 3.09 175 508 683 0.74 2.90
EU AVEf 213 583 796 0.73 2.73 221 410 631 0.65 1.85
The situation described above represents an important evolution. Firstly, the 
discussions on the carbon/energy tax have made it clear that in the current 
institutional context, Member States prefer not to create a new harmonised tax 
system. Thus, for the time being the requirement for unanimity in the Council of 
Ministers when voting on fiscal issues is set to stay. Secondly, despite the 
existence of this institutional constraint, Member States nevertheless need a 
Community framework to develop their fiscal policies, in particular on product 
taxation, as goods can be freely traded throughout the internal market without 
border controls. As a consequence of both considerations, the Commission was 
asked by the Member States in 1996 to develop a comprehensive Community 
approach towards the taxation of energy products, based on the experience with 
the system of excise duties.
On 12 March 1997, the Commission adopted a new energy tax proposal 
(COM(97)30), to be submitted to the Council and the European Parliament for 
decision. This proposal for a Directive intends to modernize the Community 
system for the taxation of mineral oils and extends its scope to other energy 




























































































The Commission is thus meeting the obligation contained in Article 10 of 
Directive 92/82/EEC to review the minimum rates of excise duty on mineral 
oils. It is also responding to the Council’s request, expressed following the 
deadlock of negotiations on the C 0 2/energy tax, that it should present new 
proposals in the field of the taxation of energy products. Lastly, it takes into 
account the European Parliament opinion on the Commission’s report on 
minimum excise duty rates (COM(95)285, 13.9.95), which asks it to define a 
consistent basis for taxation covering both mineral oils and competing products.
In addition, the Commission has recently presented a draft Directive laying 
down technical specifications which fuels to be put on the market in the 
Community must satisfy (COM(96)248). This will trigger new investments and 
operating costs for the oil industry, estimated at ECU 13.2 billion over 15 years. 
It would be unnecessarily costly to set up such standards at a level well beyond 
what most local environmental conditions within the EU might require. Thus 
the proposed Directive may require marketing of higher quality fuels.
Therefore Community framework legislation in this area was necessary to 
allow member states to use tax incentive schemes for cleaner fuels. It allows 
Member States to provide fiscal incentives in favour of cleaner fuels. Such 
differentiation within a Community framework can enhance the market 
penetration of higher quality fuels without disrupting the internal market. The 
internal market is undisrupted as the Directive specifies some cleaner fuels for 
which Member States may provide fiscal incentives. Thereby there may be two 
or three different fuel specifications in the EU, instead of perhaps 30, which 
would be the case if each Member State had two separate specifications.
Since its implementation, a number of Member States have utilised the 
possibility offered by the directive to apply tax differentiations in connection 
with objectives of environmental policy. In addition to the leaded/unleaded 
differential, six member states (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, Finland) 
already apply or have requested to apply duty differentials based on the 
environmental qualities of fuels.
Car emissions
In the field of car emissions, there are harmonised technical regulations in order 
to create an internal market for cars in which competition can be free and fair. 
The Community has defined a legally required technical standard which all new 
cars must fulfill. Before this standard was mandatory, it was known for several 





























































































The Directive in question (94/62 EC) describes a precise framework for the 
use of fiscal incentives by the Member States, via the sales tax, to favour cars 
fulfilling the stricter standards before they became compulsory (see chs 3 and 
4). The Directive is thus an example of a harmonised framework, where each 
Member State could work out the specific details of the environmental 
instrument according to their preferences and tax systems.
At the same time a well functioning internal market was maintained, as there 
was a maximum of two different technical specifications which car firms 
needed to adopt—the compulsory lower standard, and if they so wished, the 
higher standard to enjoy the tax discounts given by some Member States.
The Community is currently working out future emission standards for cars. 
As this work is somewhat delayed, there is right now only one Community 
standard (which applies to all cars sold today). There is therefore no future 
standard that Member States can give tax incentives to. Some Member States 
therefore currently give tax incentives for the purchase of new cars with 
technical specifications that go beyond those of existing Community law. This 
may not be fully in accordance with the Directive, but might be accepted due to 
the delay of the new Community legislation on future emission standards.
Conclusions
Pressures to reconsider the traditional command and control approach towards 
environmental policy have generated a lively debate in the European Union. 
This debate centres around three key issues: the requirements of the 
environment chapter of the Treaty on European Union, the safeguarding of 
sound competition within the internal market, and the recognition of the 
cultural, political and environmental differences amongst the Member States.
Broadening the range of environmental policy instruments available at both 
the EU and national level remains firmly on the Commission’s agenda. The de­
regulation trend in recent years reinforces, through its insistence on a cost- 
effective environmental policy, the critical role of a variety of instruments at the 
disposal of the Member States. This evolution coincides with the desire of 
Member States to follow their own preferences in the use of a particular 
instrument.
For reasons related to the different environmental conditions of Member 
States and the different preferences of their population for environmental policy 




























































































of levies to be developed at the national level. According to the Eurobarometer 
1995, national ‘green’ taxes receive a high degree of public support throughout 
the EU.
The existence of an internal market, however, has a tendency to impose a 
significant degree of convergence on the instruments chosen by Member States. 
Furthermore, current Community legislation specifies some limitations to the 
use of particular environmental policy instruments. Thus the Commission’s 
essential role is in developing explicit frameworks on the use of some 
instruments such as energy taxes and specifications on how to use taxes to 
encourage sales of environmentally improved cars and fuels.
The Commission has also issued more general guidelines, which shows the 
room for national action on environmental policy instruments such as 





























































































Collier, U. (ed.) (1997) Deregulation in the European Union: Environmental 
Perspectives (London : Routledge).
EC (1992) “Communication on Industrial Competitiveness and Environmental 
Protection,” SEC(92)1986, 24 November (Brussels:Commission of the 
European Communities).
EC (1993) “Towards Sustainability,” Fifth Environmental Action Programme, 
(Luxembourg:Commission of the European Communities).
EC (1994) “Communication on Economic Growth and the Environment: Some 
Implications for Economic Policymaking," COM(94)465, 3 November 
(Brussels:Commission of the European Communities).
EC (1995) “Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Legislative and 
Administrative Simplification,” COM(95)288, 21 June
(BrusselsiCommission of the European Communities).
EC (1996) “Economic Incentives and Disincentives for Environmental 
Protection,” proceedings of European Commission and Council Presidency 
conference, Rome, 7 June.
EC (1997) ‘Tax Provisions with a Potential Impact on Environmental 
Protection,” (carried out by Moret, Ernst & Young) (Luxembourg:Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities).
Golub (1997a) “Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy: 
Introduction and Overview,” in J. Golub (ed.) Global Competition and EU 
Environmental Policy (London:Routledge).
Heller, T. (1997) “The Path to EU Climate Change Policy,” in J. Golub (ed.) 
Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy (London:Routledge).
Skjaerseth, J. (1994) “Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle,” Journal of 






















































































































































































Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre 
Published since 1997
RSC No. 97/1
Donatella della PORTA/Herbert REITER 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Policing Protest in the United States: From
the 1960s to the 1990s
RSC No. 97/4
Olivier FILLIEULE/Fabien JOBARD 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
The Policing o f Protest in France: Towards 
a Model o f Protest Policing
RSC No. 97/5
Dominique WISLER/Hanspeter KRIESI 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Public Order, Protest Cycles and Political 
Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared
RSC No. 97/6 
P.A.J. WADDINGTON 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Controlling Protest in Contemporary, 
Historical and Comparative Perspective
RSC No. 97/7
Herbert REITER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police and Public Order in Italy, 1944-1948. 
The Case o f Florence
RSC No. 97/8
Oscar JAIME-JIMENEZ
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f Social Protest in Spain:
From Dictatorship to Democracy
RSC No. 97/9
Martin WINTER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f Hooliganism in Italy
RSC No. 97/11
Donatella della PORTA
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Police Knowledge and Public Order:
Some Reflections on the Italian Case
RSC No. 97/12
Patrick A. McCa r t h y




Greening the EC Regional and Cohesion
Funds. Explaining Variation Across Similar
Policy Areas
RSC No. 97/14
Richard SINNOTT/Nessa WINSTON 




Double Allegiance in European Integration:





























































































Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG




Zenon G. KONTOLEM1S 
Unemployment in Greece:
A Survey of the Issues
RSC No. 97/18
Olivier F1LLIEULE
«Plus 9a change, moins 9a change» -
Demonstrations in France During the
Nineteen-Eighties
RSC No. 97/19 
Tanja A. BORZEL
Policy Networks - A New Paradigm for 
European Governance?
RSC No. 97/20 
Vladimir MlKHALEV 
Poverty Alleviation in the Course of 
Transition: Policy Options for Russia
RSC No. 97/21
Susan SENIOR NELLO
Applying the New Political Economy
Approach to Agricultural Policy Formation
in the European Union
RSC No. 97/22
Repatriation. Legal and Policy Issues 
Concerning Refugees from the Former 
Yugoslavia
Proceedings o f a Roundtable Discussion, 
organised by the Working Group on 
Refugees (RSC)
RSC No. 97/23 
Simon BAGSHAW
Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining 
the Criteria for the Repatriation of Refugees 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina
RSC No. 97/24 
Sven BISLEV




Single Cases or a Unique Pair?
The Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe
RSC No. 97/26 
D. LESLIE/D. BLACKABY/ S.
DRINKWATER/P. MURPHY 
Unemployment, Ethnic Minorities and 
Discrimination
RSC No. 97/27 
Bernhard WINKLER
Maastricht Games and Maastricht Contracts
RSC No. 97/28 
Horst SIEBERT
Labor Market Rigidities and Unemployment 
in Europe
RSC No. 97/29 
Ute COLLIER
Prospects for a Sustainable Energy Policy in 
the European Union
RSC No. 97/30 
lohn MYLES/Paul PIERSON 
Friedman’s Revenge: The Reform of 
‘Liberal’ Welfare States in Canada and the 
United Stales
RSC No. 97/31
Liesbet HOOGHE/Gary MARKS 





Example, Exception or Both? Swiss 
National Identity in Perspective
RSC No. 97/33 
Dolores O'REILLY
From Slate-Control to EC Competence.
Air Transport Liberalisation
RSC No. 97/34 
Giuliana GEMELLI
From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation. 
Ford Foundation and Management 
Education in Western Europe 
(1950’s-1970’s)
Voi. 1
RSC No. 97/35 
Giuliana GEMELLI
From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation. 
Ford Foundation and Management 






























































































RSC No. 97/36 
Martin RHODES
Globalisation. Labour Marketsand Welfare 
States: A Future of ‘Competitive 
Corporatism’?
RSC No. 97/37 
Jacques M&JTZ/Axel A. WEBER 
The Costs/Benefits of a Common Monetary 
Policy in France and Germany and Possible 
Lessons for Monetary Union
RSC No. 97/38 
Jlirgen R. GROTE
Interorganizational Networks and Social 
Capital Formation in the 
South o f the South
RSC No. 97/39 
Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Substituabilities vs Complemen­
tarities Between Structural and 
Macroeconomic Policies
RSC No. 97/40
Ray BARRELL/James SEFTON 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Fiscal Policy, Real Exchange Rates 
and Monetary Union
RSC No. 97/41
Peter SINCLAIR/Nicholas HORSEWOOD 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Has the Phillips Curve Been 
Reborn?
RSC No. 97/42
Riccardo FAINI/Giampaolo GALLl/Pietro 
GENNARl/Fulvio ROSSI 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. An Empirical Puzzle: Falling 
Migrations ana Growing Unemployment 
Differentials among Italian Regions
RSC No. 97/43 
Peter WESTA WAY
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. What Determines the Natural Rate 
o f Unemployment? And What Does Not?
RSC No. 97/44
Neale O. KENNEDY 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Unemployment in the EU and the 
US: A Macroeconomic Perspective
RSC No. 97/45 
Bruno CHIARJNI/Paolo PISELLI 
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Wage Setting, Wage Curve and 
Phillips Curve: The Italian Evidence
RSC No. 97/46
Rod CROSS/Julia DARBY/ Jonathan 
IRELAND
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Hysteresis and Ranges or Intervals 
fo r Equilibrium Unemployment
RSC No. 97/47
Frank BARRY/John BRADLEY/ Joanne 
McCARTAN
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Unemployment in the EU 
Periphery: Problems and Prospects
RSC No. 97/48
Winfried VOGT
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. High Unemployment and 
Stabilisation Policy
RSC No. 97/49 
Henrik HOFMAN
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Europe as an Entity. Possibilities 




European Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Aspects. Macroeconomic Policy and the 




The Consequences of Eastern Enlargement 
of the European Union in Stages
RSC No. 97/52 
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG 
On Identifying the Core of EMU: An 
Exploration of Some Empirical Criteria
RSC No. 97/53 
Gabriele TONDL
The Ups and Downs of Regional Income 
Convergence in Europe.
Evidence from a Cross-Section and a Cross- 





























































































Michael J. ARTIS/Bemhard WINKLER 
The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the 




Regional or Local? The EU’s Future 
Partners in Cohesion Policy
RSC No. 97/56 
Christoph KNILL
Implementing European Policies: The 
Impact of National Administrative Traditions
RSC No. 97/57
Christoph KNILL/Andrea LENSCHOW 
Coping with Europe: The Impact of British 
and German Administrations on the 
Implementation of EU Environmental Policy
RSC No. 97/58
James A. CAPORASO
Across the Great Divide: Integrating
Comparative and International Politics
RSC No. 97/59 
Anne DEIGHTON 





The Transformation of West European
Capitalism?
RSC No. 97/61 
Andrea LENSCHOW
Transformation in European Environmental 
Governance
RSC No. 97/62 
Daniel VERDIER
Domestic Responses to Capital Market 
Internationalization under the Gold 
Standard, 1870-1914
RSC No. 97/63 
Manfred RIST
Die EuropSische Union als joumalisiische 
Herausforderung. Qualitat im 




Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The




Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. A
Foreign Policy in Search o f a Polity
RSC No. 97/66
Christopher J. HILL
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy.
Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics:
National Foreign Policies and the CFSP
RSC No. 97/67
Reinhardt RUMMEL/Jbrg WIEDEMANN 
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. 
Identifying Institutional Paradoxes o f CFSP
RSC No. 97/68
Karen Elizabeth SMITH
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The




Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The
European Union's Performance in World
Politics: How Should We Measure Success?
RSC No. 97/70 
Guido LENZI
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. 
Defining The European Security Policy
RSC No. 97/71 
Esther BARBÉ
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. 
Balancing Europe s Eastern and Southern 
Dimensions
RSC No. 97/72 
Jan ZIELONKA
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. 




Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy.





























































































RSC No. 97/74 
Thomas CHRISTIANSEN 
Legitimacy Dilemmas of Supranational 
Governance: The European Commission 
Between Accountability and Independence
RSC No. 98/1
Jonathan GOLUB
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Global Competition and EU 
Environmental Policy: An Overview
RSC No. 98/2 
Ian H. ROWLANDS
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. EU Policy fo r Ozone Layer 
Protection
RSC No. 98/3 
Marc PALLEMAERTS 
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Regulating Exports o f Hazardous 




Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Improving Compliance with the 
International Law of Marine Environmental 
Protection: The Role o f the European Union
RSC No. 98/5 
Thomas HELLER
Global Competition and EU Environmental 




Global Competition and EU Environmental 




Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. The World Trade Dimension o f 
"Greening" the EC's Common Agricultural 
Policy
RSC No. 98/8 
Nick ROBINS
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Competitiveness, Environmental 
Sustainability and the Future o f European 
Community Development Cooperation
RSC No. 98/9 
Thomas RISSE (with Daniela 
ENGELMANN-MARTIN/Hans-Joachim 
KNOPF/Klaus ROSCHER)
To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and 
Identity Politics in the European Union
RSC No. 98/10
Véronique PUJAS/Martin RHODES 
Party Finance and Political Scandal in Latin 
Europe
RSC No. 98/11 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
European Institutional Architecture after 
Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or 
Regulatory Structure?
RSC No. 98/12 
Jonathan GOLUB
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Instruments for  
Environmental Policy in the EU. An 
Overview
RSC No. 98/13
Stephen TINDALE/Chris HEWETT 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in the UK
RSC No. 98/14
Wolfram CREMER/Andreas FISAHN 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 




New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in the Netherlands
RSC No. 98/16
Kurt DEKETELAERE
New Instruments for Environmental Policy





























































































RSC No. 98/17 
Susana AGULAR FERNÂNDEZ 
New Instrument for Environmental Policy 
in the ELI. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in Spain
RSC No. 98/18 
Alberto MAJOCCHI
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 




New Instruments for Environmental Policy
in the EU. Negotiated Agreements in EU
Environmental Policy
RSC No. 98/20 
Eva EIDERSTRÔM
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Ecolabels in EU Environmental 
Policy
RSC No. 98/21 
Karola TASCHNER
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Environmental Management 
Systems: The European Regulation
RSC No. 98/22
Jos DELBEKE/Hans BERGMAN 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Environmental Taxes and 
Charges in the EU
•out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
*O
Ü
Q
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
